January 2025, From the Field
The fourth quarter of 2024 demonstrated a marked divergence in global equity returns, strong factor returns, and, in our view, some counterintuitive results. We believe the factor returns largely reflect the market’s response to former President Donald Trump’s reelection and the Federal Reserve’s rate-cutting cycle in the U.S. We highlight three key themes:
“...this appeared to be a counterintuitive quarter in which investor behavior was not reflective of the fundamental setup....”
Quarterly factor returns
(Fig. 1) October 1, 2024—December 31, 2024
Index | Total Return | Valuation | Growth | Momentum | Quality | Profitability | Risk | Size |
Russell 1000 Growth | 7.07% | -11.77% | 14.78% | -3.42% | -6.11% | -6.28% | 10.47% | -7.96% |
Russell 1000 | 2.75 | -9.03 | 10.51 | 2.06 | -3.07 | -0.05 | 7.07 | -1.24 |
Russell 2500 | 0.62 | -4.11 | 10.05 | -5.35 | -3.53 | -1.71 | 7.91 | -4.87 |
Russell 1000 Value |
-1.98 | -7.01 | 6.45 | 2.71 | -2.29 | -2.17 | 5.22 | -2.52 |
MSCI Japan | -3.57 | 9.17 | 0.23 | 4.96 | 0.85 | 4.71 | 6.27 | 8.87 |
MSCI Emerging Markets | -7.84 | 2.143 | 0.60 | 2.98 | -0.05 | 1.50 | 0.60 | 0.62 |
MSCI Pacific ex-Japan | -9.10 | -7.99 | 1.01 | 14.80 | 6.99 | 5.43 | -6.81 | 7.57 |
MSCI Europe | -9.68 | 2.71 | 0.61 | 6.35 | 0.83 | 3.44 | 2.16 | 3.69 |
Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results.
Sources: Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, Worldscope, Russell, and MSCI. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. See Additional Disclosures. Total return data are inU.S. dollars. Factor returns are calculated as equal‑weighted quintile spreads. Please see Appendix for more details on the factors.
Stepping back, we believe some of this market behavior is counterintuitive. It appears that the market is anticipating a similar pro-growth agenda as during Trump’s first term, but we note the starting point today is very different: Tax rates have already been cut significantly; the federal budget deficit is larger and inflation is a primary concern, so fiscal stimulus will likely be muted; and interest rates are higher and could serve as a headwind if inflation reignites. We have concerns that the market may be inappropriately extrapolating the expected impact of Trump’s actions this time. Also, historically, risk rallies have typically occurred in positive market environments; the outperformance of low quality and high risk in muted market environments suggests so-called animal spirits at the stock level that are not reflected at the index level. And finally, we note that this pro-risk, pro-growth rally happened alongside a material increase in the 10-year U.S. Treasury note yield, which is a bit counterintuitive to us given the longer-duration nature of stocks that rallied. In short, this appeared to be a counterintuitive quarter in which investor behavior was not reflective of the fundamental setup, in our opinion.
Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results.
Sources: Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, and Russell. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. See Additional Disclosures. Total return data are in U.S. dollars. Factor returns are calculated as equal-weighted quintile spreads. Please see Appendix for more details on the factors. For simplicity, we are using high risk as a proxy for low quality.
Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results.
Sources: Refinitiv/IDC data, IHS Markit, and Russell. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. See Additional Disclosures. Total return data are in U.S. dollars. Factor returns are calculated as cap-weighted quintile spreads. We define short interest with the Markit Short Interest factor. Short interest is calculated as the total value of stock on loan divided by free float market cap value. We are using quintile spreads to compare the most shorted stocks and the least shorted stocks. Risk is a proxy for low quality.
Dovetailing with our previous newsletter, we further investigate the sustainability of a winner-take-all environment that has characterized markets over the last decade. The percentage of high-earning companies has reached levels not seen in over three decades, signaling a shift in market dynamics that favors scale, innovation, and efficiency. The digital era has widened the gap between leaders and laggards, creating a landscape in which profitability and operational excellence have been sustained. A symptom of the differentiation has been excess margins.
“...the artificial intelligence (AI) cycle may make the high-margin economy more capital intensive.”
In this section, we break down the key drivers of historic margin improvement and discuss potential risks to this structural change. The main takeaways:
We present the data and consider these trade-offs below.
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, we have seen the S&P 500 multiple consistently march higher, with the year-end 2024 multiple at 21.8x forecast 12-month forward earnings, and with post‑pandemic multiples higher than at any time since the dot-com era of the late 1990s (Figure 4).
This premium multiple has been justified by persistently expanding profit margins. Analyzing quintiles of profit margins (Figure 5), we highlight two key trends. First, margins have generally been increasing for most cohorts in the last 20 years. Second, the margin advantage of the most profitable companies has been steadily growing.
Actual outcomes may differ from forward estimates.
Sources: FactSet, Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, and S&P Global. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. The aggregate multiple is calculated by dividing the aggregate market cap by the aggregate 12-month forward earnings of S&P 500 constituents.
Sources: FactSet, Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, and S&P Global. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. The chart shows the aggregate net margin of quintiles in the S&P 500. The aggregate net margin of each quintile is calculated by dividing aggregate net income by aggregate sales. Net income and sales data are calculated for the trailing 12 months. Quintiles are reconstituted monthly. Q1 represents S&P 500 companies with the highest net margins. Financials and real estate investment trusts (REITs) are excluded from the analysis throughout this section because their business models rely on generating revenue through interest income, investment returns, and asset appreciation rather than traditional product or service sales.
The year-end 2024 net margin of 9.75% for the S&P 500 compares with an average of 5.85% from 1989–2015. This improvement can be decomposed into both fundamental and sector effects. Most of the increase can be attributed to globalization and the transition to a service-based economy, as reflected in a 450-basis-point decrease in the cost of goods sold (COGS) (top chart of Figure 6). Low interest rates and a lowered U.S. corporate tax rate have also been tailwinds to margins, contributing nearly 130 basis points combined. The biggest headwind to margins has been elevated levels of R&D spending, which has detracted 220 basis points. This trend has been fueled by technological advancement and increased government subsidies in defense and health care‑related companies.
Looking at the margin expansion a different way, we analyze the impact that index composition (changing sector weights) has had (bottom chart of Figure 6). Expansion in the three technology-heavy sectors—information technology, communication services, and consumer discretionary—collectively account for over 75% of the nearly 400-basis-point improvement we observe in aggregate margin.
“Our data illustrate a systemic shift in the economy that has favored knowledge-based industries and led to historically high margin levels. This concentration of profitability should make us cautious....”
Sources: FactSet, Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, and S&P Global. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. The bar charts show the decomposition of aggregate net margin expansion in the S&P 500. For line items, a decrease (increase) in expense is a net positive (negative) to margins. For sectors, a positive(negative) bar indicates the sector contribution (detraction) to aggregate margin expansion. Financials and REITs are excluded from the analysis. COGS is cost of goods sold, SG&A is selling general and administrative expenses, D&A is depreciation and amortization, R&D is research and development. “Other” in the top bar chart refers to the leftover contribution from the remaining line items on the income statement. In the bottom bar chart, our decomposition of net margin expansion isolates the impact of changes in sector profitability while holding sector weights constant. The “Residual Effect” captures the remaining contribution, reflecting the impact of shifts in sector composition on overall margins.
Our data illustrate a systemic shift in the economy that has favored knowledge-based industries and led to historically high margin levels. This concentration of profitability should make us cautious, as any disruption to these dynamics could have outsized impacts on market performance. In the next section, we consider risks to sustained high profitability levels using the framework developed above.
The current market is dominated by high-margin, capital-light firms that leverage technology and network effects. However, this evolution is not without its vulnerabilities. Below we lay out key risks that could challenge the sustainability of margins and, relatedly, the high market multiples:
1. Unprecedented capital expenditures (capex):
Sources: FactSet, Refinitiv/IDC data, and Compustat. Analysis by T. Rowe Price shows the aggregate capex-to-sales ratio of the so-called Magnificent Seven stocks. Excludes Meta Platforms (parent of Facebook) prior to June 2012 and Tesla prior to September 2010.
Sources: FactSet, Refinitiv/IDC data, Compustat, and S&P Global. Analysis by T. Rowe Price. The chart shows the percentage of historical S&P 500 companies that have maintained a net margin above 20% for certain numbers of consecutive years. Financials and REITs are excluded from the analysis.
2. Reversing tailwinds in globalization:
3. The end of the zero interest rate era:
4. Corporate taxes have less room to fall:
5. Base rates:
As mentioned last quarter, the risk to the outside view is that it may really be different this time. The impact of technology, platform businesses, and now the race for AI are reshaping the landscape. The advantages of scale may prove more sustainable than in the past and possibly even amplify long-term profitability trends. In this evolving environment, prudent risk management and careful monitoring of quantitative factors are essential to navigating the increasingly less mean-reverting dynamics of the market.
The U.S. stock market is expensive relative to its history, but the fundamentals of some of the largest companies are also stronger than ever, and the shifting sector composition of the S&P 500 makes historical comparisons more difficult. In our view, the transition from asset-light business models to a more capital-intensive paradigm stands out as the most pivotal change. When the dust settles, this massive capex regime is likely to expose poor capital allocators, creating clear winners and losers in the market. This dynamic, combined with mounting pressures on the forces that once bolstered margins—globalization, low interest rates, and low tax rates—and the additional threat of regulatory changes, creates a backdrop that will challenge the sustainability of profitability.
Factors are our internally constructed metrics defined as follows:
Valuation: Proprietary composite of valuation metrics based on earnings, sales, book value, and dividends. Specific value factor weighting may vary by region and sector.
Growth: Proprietary composite of growth metrics based on historical and forward‑looking earnings and sales growth. Factor selection and weighting vary by region and industry.
Momentum: Proprietary measure of medium‑term price momentum.
Quality: Proprietary measure of quality based on fundamental and stock price stability; balance sheet strength; and measures of profitability, capital usage, and earnings quality.
Profitability: Return on equity.
Risk: Proprietary composite capturing stock return stability over multiple time horizons (positive return means risky stocks outperform stable stocks).
Size: Market capitalization (positive return means larger stocks outperform smaller stocks).
Quintile Spread: Also referred to as long-short returns, a quintile spread is calculated by sorting securities based on a specific characteristic or factor criterion, dividing them into five groups (or quintiles), equal-weighting the securities within each quintile, and then subtracting the bottom-quintile returns (lowest 20%) from the top-quintile returns (highest 20%).
Factors and indices cannot be invested into directly and are shown for illustrative purposes only. They do not reflect performance of actual investments nor does it reflect the reduction of fees associated with an actual investment such as trading costs and management fees.
Other definitions:
Regression analysis: a means of determining the strength and nature of a relationship between a dependent variable and one or more other independent variables. For example, it can allow investors to understand how much of a security’s return can be attributed to market movements versus other factors.
Equity Duration: A measurement of an equity investment’s price sensitivity to changes in interest rates.
Mean Reversion: A financial theory that suggests asset prices will eventually return to their long-term mean or average.
Quintile Spread: Also referred to as long-short returns, a quintile spread is calculated by sorting securities based on a specific characteristic or factor criterion, dividing them into five groups (or quintiles), equal-weighting the securities within each quintile, and then subtracting the bottom-quintile returns (lowest 20%) from the top-quintile returns (highest 20%).
For more information visit https://www.troweprice.com/en/us/glossary.
Risks: Growth stocks are subject to the volatility inherent in common stock investing, and their share price may fluctuate more than that of a income-oriented stocks. The value approach to investing carries the risk that the market will not recognize a security’s intrinsic value for a long time or that a stock judged to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced. Investing in technology stocks entails specific risks, including the potential for wide variations in performance and usually wide price swings, up and down.
All investments are subject to market risk, including the possible loss of principal.
Peter Stournaras is the co-head of Global Equity Portfolio Management in the Global Equity Division. He is a member of the Global Equity Steering Committee. He is a vice president of T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
David Corris is a co-portfolio manager of the Integrated US Small-Mid Cap Core Equity, Integrated US Large-Cap Value Equity, Integrated US Small-Cap Growth Equity, and Integrated Global Equity Strategies in the Global Equity Division. In addition, he is a member of the Investment Advisory Committees of the US Large-Cap Value Equity, US Large-Cap Equity Income, and Global Value Equity Strategies and the Integrated Equity Funds, Inc. He is a vice president of T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
Brian Dausch is a portfolio specialist in the U.S. Equity Division. He is a member of the US Large-Cap Core Equity, US Mid-Cap Value Equity, US Small-Cap Growth Equity, Integrated Equity Suite, Health Sciences Equity, US and Global Real Estate Equity, Global Natural Resources Equity, and Global Real Assets Equity Strategy teams, working closely with institutional clients, consultants, and prospects. He is a vice president of T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.
Factors or factor analysis involves targeting quantifiable firm characteristics, or “factors,” that can explain differences in stock returns. Over the last 50 years, academic research has identified hundreds of factors that impact stock returns. See Appendix for calculation methodology, definitions of financial terms, and other information. The data presented in this material is for illustrative purposes only and does not represent an actual investment nor any T. Rowe Price product.
1 "Why capital allocation matters for companies and investors,” David Giroux, March 2024.
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Important Information
This material is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended to be investment advice or a recommendation to take any particular investment action.
The views contained herein are those of the authors as of January 2025 and are subject to change without notice; these views may differ from those of other T. Rowe Price associates.
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Information contained herein is based upon sources we consider to be reliable; we do not, however, guarantee its accuracy. Actual future outcomes may differ materially from any estimates or forward‑looking statements provided.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. All investments are subject to market risk, including the possible loss of principal. All charts and tables are shown for illustrative purposes only.
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