By  Timothy C. Murray
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Are U.S. stocks too expensive?

Can levels of profitability and efficiency of U.S. tech companies be sustained?

August 2024, From the Field -

Key Insights
  • U.S. stocks appear expensive, thanks to high valuations for key technology companies.
  • The real question is whether current profit levels in the U.S. tech sector can be sustained. The growth path for artificial intelligence will be critical.
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Thus far in 2024, the U.S. economy has surprised to the downside.  This is illustrated by the Bloomberg U.S. Economic Surprise Index, which has fallen steadily since June 2023 and
entered negative territory this past March.
But the U.S. stock market, as measured by the S&P 500 Index, has done the opposite.  It had delivered a healthy return of 9.6% through August 5th—despite the recent sharp pullback..
While this disconnect between stock prices and economic momentum isn’t unheard of, it certainly isn’t the typical pattern.  It may have led investors to conclude that U.S. stocks are too expensive.

By some key measures, U.S. stock valuations do appear quite high.  As of late August 5th, the forward price-to-earnings ratio, or P/E, for the S&P 500 stood at 19.7 times earnings, significantly higher than its 25-year average of 16.4. 
The U.S. market also looks expensive when compared to other regions of the world.  As of late July, forward P/Es for the MSCI Europe, Japan, and Emerging Markets indexes were all
significantly lower than for the S&P 500.

A closer look, however, reveals that the S&P 500 valuation has been distorted by a handful of mega-cap technology stocks that have heavy weights in the index.  Known as the “Magnificent Seven,” this group includes Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla.  As of late July, these seven stocks accounted for over 31% of S&P 500 market capitalization. 
The Magnificant Seven have P/E ratios that are considerably higher than the rest of the S&P 500.  On a cap-weighted basis, the forward P/E for the Magnificent Seven was 27.8 times earnings as of August 5–versus just 17.5 for the rest of the stocks in the index. A P/E of 17.5 is still somewhat elevated relative to S&P 500 history, but considerably below both the
Magnficant Seven and the index as a whole. 

The overall sector mix within the S&P 500 is another factor that has pushed index valuation higher. This mix has changed dramatically over the last 25 years. Notably, the information
technology sector has become an increasingly large share of the index, and accounted for 32% of S&P 500 market cap as of the end of June.
 
Meanwhile, the financials and energy sectors both have steadily lost ground within the index. Together they now account for only 16% of S&P 500 market cap.
 
This is notable because, like the Magnificant Seven, technology stocks in general tend to be more expensive than financials and energy stocks. The 25-year average forward P/E for the S&P 500 technology sector is 21 times, but is just 12.8 for financials and 14.4 for energy.  So, comparing the current S&P 500 P/E with its historical average is not really an apples-to-apples comparison.

 
This can also help explain why there has been such a disconnect between U.S. economic data and the S&P 500 Index.  While the U.S. economy may be experiencing a cooling-off period, earnings in the technology sector have remained very strong, thanks to a massive
infrastructure buildout for artificial intelligence, or AI, over the past few years.
 
So, how can we account for the outsized influence of tech stocks on S&P 500 valuation? This is a difficult question to answer and typically requires deep fundamental analysis.  But when evaluating individual companies, one simple sanity check for an unusually high valuation
is to compare the P/E to the company’s return on equity, or ROE—a measure of how profitable and efficient it has been over the past year. This same analysis can be applied to the S&P 500.
 
When we make that comparison, we find that the very high P/Es for the Magnificent Seven and broader tech sector are accompanied by similarly high ROEs.
 
As of August 5th, ROE was 37.7% for the Magnificent Seven and 31.5% for the S&P tech sector as a whole versus just 16.3% for the rest of the index. Likewise, comparisons with other major regional markets find a similar relationship, with key indexes for Europe,
Japan, and the emerging markets all showing dramatically lower ROEs than the
S&P 500 along with their lower valuations.
 
The bottom line is that elevated valuations for U.S. technology stocks collectively, and for U.S. stocks in general, do not appear unreasonable when viewed in this context.  The real
question is whether the levels of profitability and efficiency that U.S. tech
companies have exhibited collectively can be sustained.
 
Undoubtedly, this question will hinge on the growth trajectory for AI. During the current infrastructure buildout, companies have been willing to commit large capital expenditures to AI initiatives without substantial evidence that these investments will be sufficiently profitable.  Eventually, that evidence will need to emerge.

While U.S. stocks may seem overvalued on the surface, a deeper analysis shows that these elevated valuations have been driven by exceptional profitability. But the sustainability of those profit levels remains an open question. As a result, our Asset Allocation Committee currently holds a broadly neutral allocation to U.S. equities.
 

Thus far in 2024, the U.S. economy has surprised to the downside. While the Bloomberg U.S. Economic Surprise Index entered negative territory in March, the S&P 500 Index had delivered a healthy return of 9.6% through August 5th—despite the recent sharp pullback. This disconnect has raised concerns that U.S. stocks are too expensive given the deteriorating backdrop.

U.S. stock valuations do appear high. As of August 5th, the forward price‑to‑earnings (P/E) ratio for the S&P 500 stood at 19.7 times earnings, still significantly higher than the 25‑year average of 16.4. The U.S. market also looked expensive when compared with other regional markets (Figure 1).

U.S. valuations appear high

(Fig. 1) Forward P/E for the S&P 500 versus 25‑year average and other regional markets
Column chart showing that the 12-month forward price-to-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 Index is significantly higher than its 25-year historical average and other regional markets, including Europe, Japan, and emerging markets.

As of August 5, 2024.
P/E averages calculated over monthly periods.
Actual future outcomes may differ materially from estimates.
Sources: T. Rowe Price analysis using data from FactSet Research Systems Inc. All rights reserved.Standard & Poor’s (see Additional Disclosures).

The tech sector distorts the picture

A closer look reveals that S&P 500 valuation has been distorted by extremely high P/Es for many U.S. tech companies—especially the mega‑cap stocks known collectively as the “Magnificent Seven.” This group includes Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla.1

Impact of mega cap technology stocks

(Fig. 2) S&P 500 valuations with and without the Magnificent Seven1
Line and area chart showing that the valuation of the S&P 500 Index has been pushed up by seven mega-cap technology stocks with extremely high price-to-earnings ratios.

July 31, 2009, through August 5, 2024.
Actual outcomes may differ materially from forward estimates.
P/E (price‑to‑earnings) ratios are market cap weighted.
Sources: T. Rowe Price analysis using data from FactSet Research Systems Inc. All rights reserved.
S&P 500 Index (see Additional Disclosures).
1The “Magnificent Seven” stocks are Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla.
The specific securities identified and described are for informational purposes only and do not represent recommendations. Not representative of an actual investment. There is no assurance that an investment in any security was or will be profitable. 

As of August 5, the Magnificent Seven showed a collective forward P/E of 27.8, versus just 17.5 for the rest of the stocks in the S&P 500 (Figure 2). Those same seven stocks accounted for almost a third (31%) of S&P 500 market capitalization, while the technology sector as a whole made up 32%. Meanwhile, the financials and energy sectors combined accounted for only 16% of S&P 500 market cap at the end of June.

This is notable because, like the Magnificent Seven, technology stocks in general tend to be more expensive than financials and energy stocks. So, comparing the current S&P 500 P/E with its historical average is not really an apples‑to‑apples comparison.

Return on equity is a reality check

When evaluating individual companies with unusually high valuations, analysts often compare the P/E with the return on equity (ROE), a measure of how profitable and efficient the company has been. This same analysis can be applied to the S&P 500.

Return on equity is a reality check

(Fig. 3) ROE vs. forward P/E ratios for selected indexes
Line and area chart showing that the valuation of the S&P 500 Index has been pushed up by seven mega-cap technology stocks with extremely high price-to-earnings ratios.

Past results are not a reliable indicator of future results. These statistics are not a projection of future results or company performance. Actual results may vary significantly.
ROEs are on a market cap‐weighted basis calculated for the trailing 12 months as of August 5, 2024.
1The “Magnificent Seven” stocks are Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla. The specific securities identified and described are for informational purposes only and do not represent recommendations. Not representative of an actual investment.
There is no assurance that an investment in any security was or will be profitable.
Sources: T. Rowe Price analysis using data from FactSet Research Systems Inc. All rights reserved. MSCI and S&P indexes (see Additional Disclosures).

As of August 5, ROE was 37.7% for the Magnificent Seven and 31.5% for the S&P tech sector as a whole versus just 16.3% for the rest of the index. Other major regional markets also showed dramatically lower ROEs (Figure 3).

The bottom line is that valuation premiums for U.S. technology stocks, and for U.S. stocks in general, do not appear unreasonable in the context of profitability. While U.S. economic momentum has slowed, tech sector earnings have remained strong, thanks to the massive buildout of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure.

The real question is whether these elevated levels of profitability and efficiency can be sustained. Eventually, evidence will need to emerge that the substantial capital investments being made in AI will yield sufficient profits.

Additionally, if the U.S. economy weakens significantly, mega-cap tech companies may become much less willing to continue increasing their capital spending.

Conclusion

While U.S. stocks may seem overvalued, a deeper analysis suggests that these elevated valuations have been driven by exceptional profitability. However, the sustainability of those profit levels remains an open question. As a result, our Asset Allocation Committee currently holds a broadly neutral allocation to U.S. equities.

Timothy C. Murray Capital Markets Strategist Multi‑Asset Division

Tim Murray is a capital market strategist in the Multi-Asset Division. Tim is a vice president of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. 

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1 The specific securities identified and described are for informational purposes only and do not represent recommendations. Not representative of an actual investment. There is no assurance that an investment in any security was or will be profitable.

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